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Abstract Multi-agent technology has been used in many
complex distributed and concurrent systems. A railway
system is such a safety critical system and careful inves-
tigation of the functional components is very important.
Study of the various functional components in communi-
cation-based train control (CBTC) system necessitates a
good structural design followed by its validation and ver-
ification through a formal modelling technique. The work
presented here is the follow up of our multi-agent-based
CBTC system for Indian railway designed using the
methodology for engineering system of software agents.
Behavioural analysis of the designed system involves
several operating scenarios that arise during train run, and
helps in understanding the reaction of the system to such
situations. This validation and verification are very
important as it allows the system designer to critically
evaluate the desired function of the system and to correct
the design errors, if any, before its actual implementation.
Modelling, validation and verification of the structural
design through Coloured petri net (CPN) are central to this
paper. Analysis of simulation results validates the efficacy
of the design.
Keywords CBTC  Multi-agent  Fault resolution 
Modelling  Validation and verification  CPN
1 Introduction
Indian railway (IR) operates several different categories of
trains, widely varying in terms of their technology, speed,
braking characteristics, etc., and termed as mixed traffic.
The present static block signalling (SBS) [1] used in IR has
several limitations with respect to line capacity utilization
and safe train operations, which can be improved through
communication-based train control (CBTC) system [2]
with moving block signalling (MBS) [3]. It is well known
that the train control network is time critical (i.e. real-time
response) and mission critical (i.e. reliability). Any oper-
ational or equipment fault may cause serious conse-
quences; therefore, safety should be especially concerned
[4]. Countries, where CBTC is in use have no such wide
variation in the train categories and thus make their oper-
ational issues simplified for the implementation of CBTC.
Hence, for study of mixed train traffic operation under
MBS with the support of multi-agent-based CBTC system,
it is necessary to propose a better train control system for
IR to overcome the limitations of the present system. It
involves developing the architectural design of multi-
agent-based CBTC system followed by modelling, vali-
dation and verification through formal approach to check
the efficacy and correctness of the designed system.
The complex, distributed, dynamic and highly interac-
tive properties of the CBTC system make the multi-agent-
based computing technique more suitable for its develop-
ment [5]. A multi-agent-based computing system has sev-
eral advantages over a traditional computing system as its
distribution property naturally decomposes the system into
multiple agents and the interactive property allows these
agents interact with each other to achieve a desired global
goal. Multi-agent-based computing technique is more
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system is divided into several geographically distributed
sub-systems in a dynamic environment and these sub-sys-
tems need to interact with each other more flexibly [6]. The
operating scenarios of railway transportation system have
similarity with the above scenario, thus making the multi-
agent technology most suitable [7–12].
Traditionally, the development of multi-agent systems
involves logical structure design and its implementation.
Methods used for the evaluation of behavioural properties
of multi-agent systems are based on actual implementation
and formal modelling. The former is based on agent
implementation tools [13] such as Java agent development
framework [14], Zeus agent building tool-kit [15], Jack
intelligent agents framework [16], etc., whereas the latter is
based on Vienna development method [17], Z notation
[18], Calculus of communicating systems programming
language [19], Language of temporal ordering specification
[20], Temporal logic [21], Communicating sequential
processes formal language [22], Petri net [23], Coloured
petri net (CPN) [24], etc. Formal modelling has several
advantages over actual implementation to check the cor-
rectness and behaviour of the design through development
of various test cases. CPN is a graphical and executable
formal modelling technique well suited for model building
and behavioural analysis of distributed and concurrent
multi-agent systems [25].
Our earlier structural design of multi-agent CBTC system
for IR [26] named Indian railways management system
(IRMS) discusses the methodology for engineering system of
software agents (MESSAGE) [27] based designdetails of sub-
goalmoving authority given to the block section. Verification
and validation of the design through a formal modelling
approach are taken up in this work. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 covers the related work and
Sect. 3 presents an overview of the proposed system. Mod-
elling of the system is presented in Sect. 4, and validation and
verification in Sect. 5. Finally Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
2 Review on CPN modelling
Various issues in research related to railway systems have
been dealt with through mathematical modelling, simula-
tions, multi-agents, soft computing techniques, etc. The
rolling stock characteristics, infrastructure and the opera-
tional rules of IR [28] make the system unique from the
other railway setup used elsewhere in the world. Taking a
cue from related research, the project necessitated the
detailed study of existing IR train control system and
proposes a multi-agent CBTC system for IR with minimal
modifications to the present setup. To the best of knowl-
edge, our work is the first to explore the issues specific to
IR that might be important to consider before moving IR to
CBTC on MBS-based infrastructure. In the following, we
discuss the use of CPN for the modelling of a few dis-
tributed and concurrent systems.
2.1 CPN modelling of multi-agent systems
An agent conversation protocol [29] has been implemented
in CPN due to its simplicity and graphical representation
along with great support for concurrency. Further, an idea
about the implementation of CPN models in a real multi-
agent framework is given. It used CPN to investigate the
working of the proposed agent conversation protocol before
its actual implementation on a real multi-agent framework.
An FIPA (foundation for intelligent physical agents)
[30] compliant agent platform called concurrent agent
platform architecture is developed in Petri net to provide
facility of inter-platform communications in multi-agent
nets (Mulan) architecture. It used Petri net to maintain the
high degree of concurrency of the multi-agent system.
An urban traffic information system to solve path
searching problem is designed as a case [31], to represent
the use of CPN for designing multi-agent system. The
authors described the multi-agent system as a specializa-
tion of distributed object oriented systems and proved the
efficacy of CPN for modelling such systems.
A hierarchical CPN-based multi-agent system is pre-
sented in [32]. Each agent is modelled as a separate net that
is connected with other agents’ nets and forms a hierar-
chical net. The behaviour of the multi-agent system is
analysed through the dynamic properties such as reacha-
bility, deadlock detection and avoidance, fairness etc.
In our earlier work [33], a multi-agent-based CBTC
framework with MBS using the MESSAGE methodology
was presented for IR, and a simplified model of sub-goal
and moving authority given using CPN was built.
2.2 CPN modelling of railway domain problems
The advantages of CPN-based formal modelling to
describe a complex system with critical requirements are
presented in [34]. It considered railways as a case and
followed a modular approach to explain different aspects of
modelling a complex system through CPN.
The timed CPN is used to model and analyse both
operating schedules and the infrastructure of a railway
station in [35]. The paper explains the use of timed CPN to
model and analyse the dynamic behaviour of large and
complex systems. It also provided a new analysis technique
that constructs a reduced reachability graph.
The modelling of interlocking tables using CPN is pre-
sented in [36]. The developed CPN models comprise sig-
nalling layout that represents the physical arrangement of
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signals according to SBS system and interlocking control
that represents actions performed for interlocking accord-
ing to interlocking tables. These basic models can be
reused to model more complex and large interlocking
systems. The verification of modelled interlocking tables in
various scenarios is presented in [37].
A study of high speed train positioning system on rail-
way line equipped with European rail traffic management
system level-2 is presented in [38]. The paper proposed a
CPN model of train movement with interaction between
train and eurobalises installed on the track that describes
the various causes of eurobalise’s degradation. The authors
focused on faults related to balise and balise transmission
module antenna, while other types of faults those may arise
during the train operation are not discussed.
A vehicle-on-board automatic train protection sub-sys-
tem of CBTC system is implemented in CPN [39]. The
work emphasized more on how to refine the basic CPN-
based model for further research in the area of vehicle-on-
board automatic train protection. The paper exemplifies the
restricted speed estimation for a running train with respect
to the obstacle on the track ahead.
To the best of our understanding, none of the above
works provided system level structural design details and
their behavioural analysis. It becomes very important to
supplement the behaviour study of the structural design
part of the designed system. With such an objective, we
split our work into two components: the structural design
followed by formal modelling of the designed system for
behavioural analysis. This report is an extension of our
earlier work [26] on structural design and focuses only on
the behavioural analysis of the IRMS safety critical system
through CPN modelling.
3 Architectural overview of IRMS
In this section, the major components of IRMS and their
interaction are reproduced from our previous work [26] to
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Fig. 1 Abstract level diagram of the IRMS [25]
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The software agent-based CBTC rail track infrastructure is
divided into areas or regions, each under the control of a zone
controller (ZC) and each with its own radio trans-receiving
system with reliable and continuous radio link. Figure 1
shows the high level architecture of IRMS which describes
the important functional components and their corresponding
agents. It consists of four principal components: ZC, station
controller (SC), trackside device control system (TSDCS) and
on-board device control system (OBDCS).
OBDCS comprises a vehicle-on-board controller and
several train borne equipment, such as global system for
mobile communications-railway trans-receiver antenna,
RFID reader, speedometer, accelerator, braking unit, driver
display screen, train integrity monitor, etc. Train borne
equipment collects the relevant information, such as train
number, speed, location identifier, direction, etc., and
periodically send it to their respective ZC. Location iden-
tifier is the location reference read by train borne RFID
reader through track side RFID tags.
Upon receipt of this information, the respective ZC
computes a safe moving authority on the basis of track
status ahead and train characteristics, and communicates to
the respective train. Further, ZC gives instructions to SC to
create the root by interlocking for the arrival or departure
of trains in the station section. Train handover between two
adjacent ZCs occurs when a train passes the overlapped ZC
boundaries.
Each station section has a single SC responsible for
interlocking (establishing or releasing a route) for the
arrival or departure of trains. The route is created by fixing
all switches presented on the path in a required position.
SC receives a route from ZC, i.e. sequence of switches and
their positions, and gives instruction one by one to TSDCS
to fix each switch in a required position. The SC on receipt
of positive acknowledgement for all required switches
from TSDCS gives route establishment acknowledgement
to ZC. If SC receives negative acknowledgement for any
required switch, it releases all switches and gives negative
route establishment acknowledgement to ZC.
Switches falling under a particular station section are
controlled by the respective TSDCS. It is responsible to fix
each individual switch in a required position. It receives a
switch identifier and its position information from the SC. If
the switch is fixed in the desired position, it transmits a posi-
tive acknowledgement to SC; otherwise negative acknowl-
edgement. TSDCS also continuously monitors the health and
status of all its switches, and reports to respective SC.
To check the correctness and behaviour of the design,
various operational scenarios (such as RFID fault, train









































Fig. 2 MAPA’s sub-agents [25]
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Fig. 3 Workflow of sub-goal moving authority given [25]
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communication fault) in block section are considered. The
system has several agents and their sub-agents, which are
distributed geographically and work cooperatively to
accomplish the sub-goals. The sub-goal moving authority
given is the key component for ensuring safety during various
faults occurring at runtime. This sub-goal is accomplished by
moving authority provider agent (MAPA) with support from
other agents. Figs. 2 and 3 describe the various sub-agents of
MAPAand their interactionwith other agents, respectively, to
provide moving authority. Circles with label C1 and C2 in
subfigures (a) and (b) of Fig. 3 connect both subfigures.
4 CPN modelling
The modelling aspects of IRMS followed by a detailed
discussion on MAPA and its sub-agents are carried in this
section.
Fig. 3 continued
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4.1 Modelling of IRMS
The CPN model is hierarchically structured into 36 subnets
or pages. Each agent functionality is modelled on a sepa-
rate page with page name same as the agent’s. Page IRMS
(see Fig. 4) is the top page and provides an abstract view of
a block section and the associated track-cum-communica-
tion infrastructure of the system. Table 1 describes the
model and simulation parameters, and Table 2 character-
izes the mixed traffic. Page IRMS has the following four
types of substitute transitions. The place connecting two
substitute transitions represents a communication link
between them.
C11 C12Cell1 Cell10C110 C111

















Fig. 4 Top-page IRMS
Table 1 Model and simulation parameters
Model parameters Simulation parameters
Component Description Parameter Value
Zone controller Central controller responsible for
both station section(s) and block
section(s)
Area under ZC (one block section
considered under one ZC)
50 km
Block section Section between two station
sections. A block section has
multiple cells
Number of block section
Number of cells




Block section length 50 km
RFID tag For train location information and
placed equidistant along the
track
Number of RFID tags per cell 500
Inter RFID spacing 10 m
Train Trains with different
characteristics are taken to form
mixed traffic
Number of trains 4
Table 2 Train characteristics of mixed traffic
Train characteristics Value
Train maximum speed 36.11–41.66 m/s
Train safe speed 27.77–33.33 m/s
Train length 150–200 m
Train CBTC system response time 0.5–1.5 s
Propulsion disable response time 0.5–1.5 s
Coast time 0.5–1.5 s
Acceleration rate 0.25–0.35 m/s
Normal braking rate 0.35–0.45 m/s
Emergency braking rate 0.55–0.65 m/s
Position uncertainty distance 10 m
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• Initialize Trains It models mixed traffic scenario.
Mixed traffic is a crowd of trains with different
physical characteristics such as train type, length,
maximum speed, braking capacity and varying running
schedules. Specific tokens represent trains and their
values represent trains’ static and dynamic
characteristics.
• Cell Each block section is divided into a number of
cells. This type of transition implements the functions
necessary for the OBDCS installed on trains and track
infrastructure.
• Access Point Substitute transition models the function-
alities of access points to facilitate the communication
between OBDCS and ZC.
• Zone Controller ZC encompasses several functionali-
ties (see Fig. 1). However, the scope of the paper limits
the discussion to two important functionalities within
ZC. First, the MAPA with a variety of fault scenarios
and resolution mechanisms; and second, the desired
functionalities of ZCSA essential for achieving the sub-
goal moving authority given.
The mixed traffic generated by page Initialize Trains
runs within the pages Cell1 to Cell10 according to the
assigned schedule. Each page of type Cell models the
segment of track equipped with installed RFID tags and the
functionality of train’s OBDCA. Train location information
along with other necessary information is transmitted from
respective Cell type page to Zone Controller page via
corresponding Access Point page type.
The page Zone Controller comprises two substitute
transitions ZCSA and MAPA. Page ZCSA models the
functionality of agent ZCSA responsible for communica-
tion between pages Access Point and MAPA. Page ZCSA
maintains a list of trains running under its control and
models the handover process of trains across ZCs. The
operations performed by page MAPA are described in the
next sub-section. Page ZCSA receives a moving authority
for the train from page MAPA and forwards it to the cor-
responding page of type Cell, via a connected page of type
Access Point.
The page of type Cell forwards the received moving
authority to the corresponding train’s OBDCA. The train’s
OBDCA updates its information and follows the moving
authority. At the time of sending the train’s location and
other essential information to the Zone Controller page,
OBDCA sets a time out of receiving the corresponding
moving authority. If the response is not received within the
set timeout, a communication failure is assumed and train’s
OBDCA activates the emergency braking mechanism. Train
retards according to its emergency braking characteristics.
The last saved location information is considered as a train’s
current location by pageMAPA. Moving authority to trailing
trains is provided based on this information for them to allow
adjust their speed. Normal operations are resumed upon
regaining the communication link.
4.2 MAPA model
Functional details and the modelling aspects of agent
MAPA and its sub-agents are described. The model
implements file handling procedures to store and process
information related to the train and track. The page MAPA
contains the following eleven substitute transitions, each
modelling the functionality of its sub-agents.
• Page ITPIA implements the initialization of trains’
position, length and direction at ZC.
• Page RFMA models the mechanism to handle RFID
faults resulting from either tag or reader malfunction-
ing. Flag value 1 indicates fault when two successive
RFID locations are not recorded. The flag value is
further used by page ERSCA for taking decision on
applying emergency brake.
• Train’s consistency information (handled by page
TTFMA) defines the overall health status of its equip-
ments, and flag value is set to 1 when the status is
healthy. Flag status is used to take decision for applying
the emergency brake by page ERSCA.
• Train partition is a fault scenario where the coaches of a
running train decouples, resulting in multiple parts of
the same train. Page TPFMA handles these faults by
taking current location and train information as input.
The train partition fault flag is set to 1 when partition
occurs. It records the last RFID tag number corre-
sponding to the parted train’s rear end that is used for
the estimation of trailing train’s moving authority.
• Page ERSCA uses the flag values pertaining to the
above faults for applying the emergency brake if
required for the affected train according to its braking
characteristics.
• Track fault is a fault scenario where a train may be
allowed to run at some restricted speed or not allowed
at all. Page TFMA operates on the file containing track
health information and their corresponding allowable
speed of the trains. This information is used by page
ORSCA for safe moving authority calculation. The
track health file is continuously updated from the track
fault detection devices.
• Collision-free train running dependsmuch onmaintaining
a safe distance from its successor trains. This necessitates
recording of successor trains’ rear end location for the
calculation of safe moving authority for the trailing train.
Page STMA implements this functionality.
• The moving authority for a train is affected by
successor trains and ahead track faults which are
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referred to as obstacles. In some kind of track faults, the
train is allowed but with restricted speed. Page ORSCA
takes the successor trains’ (including parted trains’)
information and fault data of track ahead to calculate
the allowable speed corresponding to each obstacle and
takes the minimum of all. It is used by page SBDCA for
final allowable speed calculation.
• Turnouts on rail track have speed restrictions and the
running trains must follow these restrictions. Page
TRSCA implements and ensures the prescribed speed
restrictions. It takes the specifications of the turnout
ahead (like its location and allowed speed) and train
information to calculate the allowable speed.
• Safe braking distance is an important factor for
collision-free train operation. To ensure this, the system
must alert the running train sufficiently ahead in time so
that the train can be stopped according to its braking
characteristics. Page SBDCA takes the obstacle
restricted speed from page ORSCA, emergency brake
restricted speed from page ERSCA and turnout
restricted speed from page TRSCA as input to estimate
the final allowable speed. The safe braking distance is
computed based on the final allowable speed and train’s
braking characteristics.
• When a fault is detected, a train’s normal running is
affected either by completely stopping the train or
allowing running at a restricted speed until normalcy is
restored. Page TRMA models detection of fault and
waits for a random period. This random period models
the fault recovery time. Once restored, the system
initiates the process of computing the moving authority.
5 Validation and verification
Validation allows checking whether or not the developed
model meets the expected behaviour and verification
allows identifying errors and anomalous properties in the
developed model. CPN provides a simulation facility for
the validation and a state space graph for the verification of
the developed models.
5.1 Validation
A simulation study under mixed traffic condition is done to
understand the behavioural aspects of the model to achieve
sub-goal moving authority given. The prime objective is to
provide a moving authority for the trains to ensure colli-
sion-free movement and to study the proactive behaviour
of IRMS to fault scenarios. The CPN model has been tested
for its validity through simulation report analysis. The
simulation report is used to extract relevant data to create
graphical representations of simulation results.
Availability of aggregated time series data pertaining to
various faults is not maintained by any department in IR.
Mostly, the faults are rectified by the local technical field
staff and practically there is no record keeping mechanism
of such data for future analysis. Thus, obtaining such fault
related data and fitting it to a model was not possible.
To evaluate the working of the model in the actual
traffic scenario, we conducted several experiments for a
group of trains with different characteristics representing
the mixed traffic. The system deals with two kinds of
parameters associated with the track: operator defined
which is static and deterministic such as the maximum
allowable speed on the track, turnout restricted speed. The
other arising in real time is dynamic and random, e.g. speed
restrictions due to track faults, train equipment faults or
any kind of obstacle on the track. Due to the static and
dynamic parameters, trains’ normal running is affected.
However, as the static parameters are deterministic, the
system has prior knowledge about this. The system takes
care of such restrictions while estimating moving authority
for the trains. On the other hand, the occurrence of dynamic
parameters is known at runtime and this is challenging
while estimating moving authority for the trains. In our
work, both scenarios have been taken to test the overall
responsiveness of the proposed system. The results
obtained are categorized into two parts: one showing the
relationship between speed and location to represent the
safe moving authority provided to the trains for their safe
running in case of any fault scenario identified in runtime,
and second, the relationship between time and location to
represent the collision-free running of the trains in the same
scenario. For the purpose of describing the behavioural
analysis, we considered only one instance from several
simulation experiments for each fault type.
5.1.1 RFID fault
Failure of RFID tag or RFID reader results in failure of
recording the location information, and in such a scenario
the train(s) must be stopped for safety reasons. A tag fault
is detected, a by page RFMA at RFID tag 2,501 by train
1120 (Fig. 5) running at speed 31.53 m/s. Page ERSCA
estimates speed according to emergency braking charac-
teristics of the affected train. The affected train and the
following trains adjust their speeds according to the mov-
ing authority received from MAPA (shown by decreasing
speed curves). The increasing speed curves (starting at tag
2,531) indicate the train encountered healthy RFID tags,
and eventually regain the normal speed at tag 2,591. The
speed curves of all trains gradually drop to zero in the same
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sequence of their dispatch prior to the end of the block
section at RFID tag 5,000. The non-intersecting time
curves in Fig. 6 represent the running of a collision-free
train during handling of RFID faults. The time curves
pertaining to trains between location 2,501 and 2,530 show
a slight jump, indicating the slow speed of trains in the






















Fig. 5 Speed versus location (RFID tag fault)


















Fig. 6 Time versus location (RFID tag fault)





















Fig. 7 Speed versus location (Train equipment fault)



















Fig. 8 Time versus location (Train equipment fault)
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Fig. 9 Speed versus location (Train partition fault)



















Fig. 10 Time versus location (Train partition fault)





















Fig. 11 Speed versus location (Track fault with 10.0 m/s restricted speed)


















Fig. 12 Time versus location (Track fault with 10.0 m/s restricted
speed)
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fault section. Finally, when trains stop at the end of the
block section, the upward movement of their time curves
(see Fig. 6) indicates that the trains have stopped.
5.1.2 Train equipment fault
Page OBDCA periodically sends a consistency report to ZC
indicating the health status of train borne equipment. Pages
TTFMA and ERSCA of MAPA process the consistency
report and an issue emergency brake command if a fault is
detected. Equipment fault in train 1118 detected at location
2,750 (Fig. 7) causes page MAPA to command the appli-
cation of emergency brakes. The train decelerates from its
present speed of 29.5 m/s and finally stopped at tag 2,820.
Trailing trains decelerate according to the moving authority
received to maintain a safe braking distance from leading
trains. The time curve of train 1118 going vertically
straight (Fig. 8) at location 2,820 represents the fault rec-
tification time (528.45 s). Time curves of trailing trains
show that all trailing trains are stopped due to the fault on
the leading train. The increasing speed curves (starting at
tag 2,820) indicate that the fault has been rectified and
eventually all trains regains their normal speed.
5.1.3 Train partition fault
When a partition fault is detected, the trailing trains are not
allowed to enter into the area between the locations where
train partition was detected and its final halt point, until the
parted coaches are coupled. The response of the system to
partition faults is shown in Fig. 9. Pages TPFMA and
ERSCA of MAPA detect the partition of train 1118 at
location 3,001 and instruct to apply the emergency brake.
Upon receiving moving authority, it starts deceleration
from its present speed of 29.5 m/s and finally stops at
location 3,071. The rear end’s parted coaches may be
anywhere between the RFID tag 3,001 and 3,071. Trailing
trains receive moving authority to stop prior to the location
3,001. The time curve of train 1118 going vertically
straight (Fig. 10) at location 3,071 represents the fault
rectification time (654.76 s). The results show that system
is able to move trains safely even in train partition fault
situations.
5.1.4 Track fault (restricted speed 10.0 m/s)
Trains are allowed to run at some restricted speed when a
portion of the track is not healthy enough to support train
run at normal speeds. Pages TFMA and ORSCA of MAPA
deal with track faults to control speeds of trains according
to the applicable speed restrictions. Figure 11 depicts a
restricted speed region between location 3,501 and 3,700
where the trains are required to run at reduced speed of
10.0 m/s. The leading train 1120 running at speed 31.53 m/
s decelerates at location 3,374 and reaches the restricted
speed at location 3,501. After the restricted speed region,





















Fig. 13 Speed versus location (Communication fault)



















Fig. 14 Time versus location (Communication fault)
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Boundedness properties Upper Lower
Best integer bounds
IRMS’A2T11 1 2 0
RMS’A2Z11 1 2 0
…… …… ……
Best upper multi-set bounds
IRMS’A2T11 1 10(51, 111, 2.236, 200.0, 1,(501, 510.0, 41.66, 10.0, 80,000.0, 26.4098)) ??
10(51, 112, 2.4083, 200.0, 1,(501, 510.0, 41.66, 10.0, 80,000.0, 28.5, 292)) ??
10(52, 111, 3.1622, 200.0, 1,(501, 520.0, 41.66, 10.0, 80,000.0, 32.8198)) ??
10(52, 112, 3.4058, 200.0, 1,(501, 520.0, 41.66, 10.0, 80,000.0, 37.058))
……
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trains accelerate to their normal speed while maintaining
safe braking distance between them. The time curves of the
trains (Fig. 12) between location 3,501 and 3,700 show an
upward trend, indicating trains running at restricted speed
and taking more time to cross the restricted region in the
track section.
5.1.5 Communication fault
Fault during communication in safety critical systems can
be attributed to the message omissions, bit flips and time-
liness of message arrivals. Scenarios arising out of these
faults affect the safe movement of trains. Bit flip faults can
be handled with the help of any message consistency check
methods and are not considered here. If the train does not
receive moving authority from ZC within a timeout, its
OBDCA stops train by application of emergency brake.
Figure 13 depicts communication failure between all trains
and ZC for 550.0 s (at the simulation time 750.0 s). All
trains decelerate as a result of emergency braking shown by
the decreasing speed curves, and their corresponding stop
locations indicate that the trains maintain safe distance.
Trains accelerate when the communication is regained. The
vertical straight part of the time curves (Fig. 14) of trains
represents that the trains have stopped due to communi-
cation failure.
5.2 Verification
The state space report obtained from the model is analysed
to check the correctness of the model and see if the model
satisfies dynamic properties. Complex models with a large
number of continuous variables generate large state space
graph and report that is difficult to analyse. To arrive at a
state space graph and report that is convenient to analyse,
we reduced the number of trains from four to two and the
track length from 50 km (5,000 RFID tags) to 1 km (100
RFID tags). Despite of this size reduction, the resulting
state space graph was too large for visual analysis.
Whereas, the size of state space report was relatively
convenient in comparison state space graph. Therefore, the
standard state space report for the reduced model (Table 3)
is considered for verification.
The partial state space graph created 41,782 nodes and
161,171 arcs in 300 s of simulation run. The graph contains
strongly connected components (SSC) equal to the state
space nodes, implying that the model does not have any
SSC with more than one node, and hence no infinite
occurrence sequences. In other words, the execution of
model terminates. The integer and multi-set bounds rep-
resent the maximum and minimum number of tokens and
their values each place may contain. Due to the large
quantity of places and tokens involved in the model, their
discussion is insignificant and not necessary. The initial
marking of the model is not a home marking which means
the initial marking is not reachable from all reachable
markings. The model has 2,628 dead markings, indicating
that there are 2,628 different ways to the model stopping.
The model contains 6 dead transitions, meaning that these
transitions were not enabled during the simulation run.
Absences of the live transitions indicate the model termi-
nation. The fairness properties show how often the indi-
vidual transitions occurred. As shown in the report, the
model does not have any infinite occurrence sequences.
The state space report gives a first rough idea about if the
model works as expected and presents a number of useful
information about its behaviour. A faulty model reflects
errors in its state space report.
6 Conclusion
A CPN-based formal model of moving authority given sub-
goal for block section is presented. The state space report
verifies the model correctness in terms of the reachability,
boundedness, liveness and home properties. Various fault
scenarios have been modelled to make the behaviour anal-
ysis of the overall model. The outcome of the behavioural
analysis allowed us to justify the design correctness of the
proposed CBTC system for IR. The test of our models based
on actual fault data collected over a period can help correlate
the proposed models’ behaviour with the present simulation
results. Further, such actual data can be statisticallymodelled
to understand the pattern of fault occurrence thatmay help IR
to take preventive measures.
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